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Abstract 
 
Does higher income cause democracy? Accounting for the dynamic nature and high 
persistence of income and democracy, we find a statistically significant positive relation 
between income and democracy for a postwar period sample of up to 150 countries. Our 
results are robust across different model specifications and instrument sets. 
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Higher levels of income cause the establishment of democratic regimes. This
cornerstone of “modernization theory” (see Lipset, 1959) is increasingly ac-
cepted by economists and political scientists alike. Reviewing the existing
literature reveals that the empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports mod-
ernization theory.1 However, a recent paper by Acemoglu et al. (2008) argues
that the empirically observed correlation is spurious. They show that the
relationship between democracy and income breaks down when controlling
for country and time-ﬁxed eﬀects using a postwar period (1960–2000) sam-
ple of countries. Instead, both democracy and higher income are caused by
underlying changes in institutional arrangements and are contingent on spe-
ciﬁc historic events. This alternative view is dubbed the “critical junctures
hypothesis” (for a short review see Acemoglu et al., 2009).
Empirical evidence supporting modernization theory relies on SUR re-
gressions, ﬁxed eﬀects and non-linear panel speciﬁcations whereas Acemoglu
et al. (2008) employ the dynamic panel estimator by Arellano and Bond
(1991). All these studies do not take into account the high persistence of
income and democracy.
We therefore follow Arellano and Bover (1995) as well as Blundell and
Bond (1998) and present empirical evidence using system GMM which per-
forms well with highly persistent data under mild assumptions. We show
that even in the smaller postwar period sample with up to 150 countries
used by Acemoglu et al. (2008), we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant positive
relation between income and democracy.
2 Identiﬁcation assumptions
Acemoglu et al. (2008) estimate the following dynamic panel model:
dit = dit 1 + yit 1 + x0
it 1 + i + t + uit; (1)
where dit is the democracy level of country i, yit 1 is the lagged log GDP per
capita, xit 1 is a vector of lagged control variables, i and t denote sets of
country dummies and time eﬀects and uit is an error term with E(uit) = 0
for all i and t.
Acemoglu et al. (2008) use the diﬀerence GMM estimator as proposed
by Arellano and Bond (1991) to estimate Equation (1). This estimator is
1For example, Barro (1999) uses a SUR regression framework, Gundlach and Paldam
(2009) use repeated cross-sectional analysis, Corvalan (2010) uses a panel probit estimator,
Boix (2011) and Treisman (2011) use a ﬁxed eﬀects panel estimator, Benhabib et al. (2011)
use non-linear panel estimators and Moral-Benito and Bartolucci (2011) use the Arellano
and Bond (1991) estimator as well as a limited information maximum likelihood approach
(LIML).
1based upon the following orthogonality conditions:2
E(dit suit) = 0 for t = 3;:::;T and 2  s  T   1; (2)
where dit s are suitable lags of the dependent variable. In essence, the second
and further lags of the dependent variable are used as an instrument for the
residual of Equation (1) in diﬀerences.
However, this estimator suﬀers from potentially huge small sample bias
when the number of time periods is small and the dependent variable shows
a high degree of persistence (see Alonso-Borrego and Arellano, 1999). A
standard procedure in the literature to mitigate the persistence in the data
is to rely on ﬁve year intervals or averages. This reduces the number of ob-
servations considerably, while income and democracy are still substantially
persistent. We follow Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond
(1998) and present estimates of Equation (1) using system GMM which cir-
cumvents the ﬁnite sample bias if one is willing to assume a mild stationarity
assumption on the initial conditions of the underlying data generating pro-
cess.3 In addition to the moment conditions speciﬁed in Equation (2) this
estimator uses the following moment conditions:
E(dit 1(i + uit)) = 0 for t = 3;:::;T; (3)
i.e., we use lagged ﬁrst-diﬀerences of the dependent variable to construct
the orthogonality conditions for the error term of Equation (1) in levels.
Additional orthogonality conditions for both diﬀerence and system GMM
arise from suitable lags of the lagged explanatory variables in levels which
can be treated as either endogenous, predetermined or strictly exogenous.
The asymptotic eﬃciency gains brought about by the additional orthogo-
nality conditions of the system GMM estimator do not come without a cost:
The number of instruments tends to increase exponentially with the number
of time periods. This proliferation of instruments leads to a ﬁnite sample
bias due to the overﬁtting of endogenous variables and increases the likeli-
hood of false positive results and suspiciously high pass rates of speciﬁcation
tests like the Hansen (1982) J-test, a routinely used statistic to check the va-
lidity of a dynamic panel model (see Roodman, 2009b). We follow Roodman
(2009b) and also present results with a collapsed instrument matrix and use
only two lags for both the diﬀerence and system GMM estimators.4 We also
employ the Windmeijer (2005) ﬁnite sample correction for standard errors.
2For a good textbook treatment of (dynamic) panel estimators (see Baltagi, 2008).
3Speciﬁcally, the deviations from the long-run mean of the dependent variable have to
be uncorrelated with the stationary individual-speciﬁc long-run mean itself (see Blundell
and Bond, 1998). As there are no a priori reasons to believe that the speed of change in
a country’s political system is related to its current level of democracy this stationarity
condition does not seem unduly restrictive.
4All GMM estimations are carried out using the xtabond2 package in Stata (see Rood-
man, 2009a).
23 Results
Table 1 reports the baseline results of estimation of Equation (1) across vari-
ous estimators. We employ an unbalanced panel with ﬁve-year interval data
from 1960 to 2000 taken from Acemoglu et al. (2008). The dependent vari-
able is the Augmented Freedom House Political Rights Index from 0 to 1.
Column (1) shows the results of the pooled OLS estimator and column (2)
shows the results of the ﬁxed eﬀects (within) OLS estimator. Both regres-
sions use robust standard errors clustered by country. These estimates are
informative because they provide the lower and upper bound for the autore-
gressive coeﬃcient for democracy (for details see Bond, 2002). As can be
seen, this lower bound is equal to 0.379 whereas the upper bound is 0.706.
Both are positive and highly statistically signiﬁcant. Concerning lagged log
GDP per capita we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect in the pooled OLS
model and no systematic inﬂuence in the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation.
Columns (3) to (5) employ diﬀerence GMM estimators. In column (3) the
results from the one-step diﬀerence GMM estimator are reported, whereas in
columns (4) and (5) we report the results from the two-step diﬀerence GMM
estimator. All GMM regressions use robust standard errors and treat the
lagged democracy measure as predetermined. In the two-step GMM esti-
mates, the Windmeijer (2005) ﬁnite sample correction for standard errors is
employed. In column (5) also log GDP per capita is treated as endogenous.
Note that column (3) reproduces column (2) in Table 2 of Acemoglu et al.
(2008). While in all diﬀerence GMM estimates the autoregressive coeﬃcient
lies within the bound given by columns (1) and (2), the sign of the coeﬃ-
cient for lagged log GDP per capita becomes negative and weakly signiﬁcant.
However, as motivated in the introduction and when discussing our identi-
ﬁcation strategy, the one- and two-step diﬀerenced GMM estimators do not
take into account the high persistence of income and democracy.
We therefore present system GMM estimates in columns (6) to (8).
Whereas column (6) reproduces column (5) using the system GMM estima-
tor, column (7) follows the advice given in Roodman (2009b) and collapses
the instrument matrix and only uses two lags as instruments. Column (8)
includes lagged log population, lagged education and lagged age structure as
additional controls. All speciﬁcations show an estimated autoregressive coef-
ﬁcient that lies between the two bounds given in columns (1) and (2). How-
ever, lagged log GDP per capita has now a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on
democracy. The point estimate of lagged log GDP in the speciﬁcation given
in column (6) is 0.118, implying that a one percent increase of lagged GDP
increases the steady-state value of democracy by 0.26 percentage points.5
The row for the Hansen J-test reports the p-values for the null hypothesis
of the validity of the overidentifying restrictions. In all speciﬁcations we do
5The long-run eﬀect is calculated as =(1   ).
3not reject the null hypothesis. The values reported for the Diﬀ-in-Hansen
test are the p-values for the validity of the additional moment restriction nec-
essary for system GMM given in Equation (3). Again, we do not reject the
null that the additional moment conditions are valid. The values reported
for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for ﬁrst and second order autocor-
related disturbances in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced equation. As expected, there is
high ﬁrst order autocorrelation, and no evidence for signiﬁcant second order
autocorrelation. To sum up, our test statistics hint at a proper speciﬁcation.
In Tables 2 and 3 we check the robustness of our results against inclusion
of additional external instruments as used by Acemoglu et al. (2008). In Ta-
ble 2, we use the trade-weighted world-income of the respective country as
an additional external instrument. We report the one- and two-step diﬀer-
ence GMM estimates alongside the system GMM estimates with otherwise
similar speciﬁcations as in Table 1. Again, the autocorrelation parameter is
statistically signiﬁcant and of similar magnitude. Most importantly, as in
Table 1 the coeﬃcient of lagged GDP per capita changes its sign going from
the diﬀerence GMM to the system GMM estimates when using the world-
income share as additional instrument. In the system GMM estimates, it
turns out to be positive and signiﬁcant again. Again, all the speciﬁcation
tests indicate a well-speciﬁed model.
In Table 3 we use the second lag of the savings rate of the countries as an
additional external instrument instead. Here, we again ﬁnd a change in the
sign from negative to positive on the lagged GDP per capita variable when
moving from diﬀerence to system GMM estimates. The model speciﬁcation
tests also indicate a well-speciﬁed model across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
Only the Hansen tests for the system GMM estimates using the collapsed
instrument matrix in column (5) reject the null of the validity of the overi-
dentifying restrictions. However, the tests for autocorrelation in the lagged
disturbances indicate that the model is well speciﬁed. This could well be due
to the use of the collapsed instruments as the asymptotic behavior of this ad
hoc method is not well understood (see Roodman, 2009b). As the Hansen
tests are known to have weak power and all results are in line with our pre-
vious ones, we still believe that we have properly identiﬁed the inﬂuence of
GDP on democracy.
4 Conclusions
When studying the potentially causal relationship between income and democ-
racy, one has to account for the dynamic nature and the high persistence of
the data. Employing system GMM estimators, we reexamine the nexus be-
tween income and democracy. We ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant positive
relation between income and democracy for a postwar period sample of up
to 150 countries. We check the robustness of our results with respect to
4model speciﬁcation and instrumentation strategies.
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6Table 1: Baseline results
Pooled FE Diﬀ-1 Diﬀ-2 Diﬀ-2 Sys-2 Sys-2 Sys-2
OLS OLS GMM (AJRY) GMM GMM END GMM END GMM END CL GMM END CL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable is Democracyt
Democracyt 1 0.706*** 0.379*** 0.489*** 0.528*** 0.432*** 0.548*** 0.568*** 0.546***
(0.035) (0.051) (0.085) (0.105) (0.085) (0.053) (0.063) (0.076)
Log GDP per capitat 1 0.072*** 0.010 -0.129* -0.012 -0.097* 0.118*** 0.136*** 0.110*
(0.010) (0.035) (0.076) (0.065) (0.053) (0.020) (0.023) (0.060)
Controls No No No No No No No Yes
Instruments 55 55 90 108 16 21
Hansen J-test [0.260] [0.260] [0.273] [0.131] [0.778] [0.614]
Diﬀ-in-Hansen test [0.298] [0.791] [0.268]
AR(1) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) [0.448] [0.421] [0.540] [0.332] [0.297] [0.875]
Observations 945 945 838 838 838 945 945 676
Countries 150 150 127 127 127 150 150 95
Notes: Base sample – taken from Acemoglu et al. (2008) – is an unbalanced panel spanning from 1960–2000 with data at ﬁve-year intervals, where the start date of the panel refers
to the dependent variable. The dependent variable is the Augmented Freedom House Political Rights Index. Standard errors are in parentheses, p-values in brackets. Pooled and
FE OLS regressions use robust standard errors clustered by country. All GMM regressions use robust standard errors and treat the lagged democracy measure as predetermined.
In addition to that, regressions with suﬃx “END” treat lagged log GDP per capita as endogenous and regressions with suﬃx “CL” follow Roodman (2009b) and collapse the
instrument matrix and use only two lags. In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) ﬁnite sample correction for standard errors is employed. In the last column, lagged
log population, lagged education (average years of total schooling) and lagged age structure are added as controls. Age structure is speciﬁed as median age of the population at
t 1 and four covariates corresponding to the percent of the population at t 1 in the following age groups: 0–15, 15–30, 30–45, and 45–60. *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance at the
10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively. The row for the Hansen J-test reports the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diﬀ-in-Hansen
test are the p-values for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for ﬁrst and second
order autocorrelated disturbances in the ﬁrst diﬀerences equations.
7Table 2: Trade-weighted world income instrument
Diﬀ-1 Diﬀ-2 Diﬀ-2 Sys-2 Sys-2
GMM (AJRY) GMM GMM END GMM END GMM END CL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable is Democracyt
Democracyt 1 0.478*** 0.521*** 0.427*** 0.547*** 0.578***
(0.094) (0.112) (0.086) (0.053) (0.066)
Log GDP per capitat 1 -0.133* -0.027 -0.117** 0.110*** 0.128***
(0.077) (0.064) (0.052) (0.023) (0.024)
Instruments 55 55 91 109 17
Hansen J-test [0.191] [0.191] [0.144] [0.158] [0.597]
Diﬀ-in-Hansen test [0.185] [0.331]
AR(1) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) [0.502] [0.472] [0.604] [0.367] [0.320]
Observations 812 812 812 895 895
Countries 122 122 122 124 124
Notes: Base sample – taken from Acemoglu et al. (2008) – is an unbalanced panel spanning from 1960–2000 with data at
ﬁve-year intervals, where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable. The dependent variable is the Augmented
Freedom House Political Rights Index. Standard errors are in parentheses, p-values in brackets. All GMM regressions use robust
standard errors and treat the lagged democracy measure as predetermined as well as the lagged trade-weighted world income as
additional external instrument. In addition to that, regressions with suﬃx “END” treat lagged log GDP per capita as endogenous
and regressions with suﬃx “CL” follow Roodman (2009b) and collapse the instrument matrix and use only two lags. In the
case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) ﬁnite sample correction for standard errors is employed. *, ** and *** denote
signiﬁcance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively. The row for the Hansen J-test reports the p-values for the null hypothesis
of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diﬀ-in-Hansen test are the p-values for the validity of the additional moment
restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for ﬁrst and second order
autocorrelated disturbances in the ﬁrst diﬀerences equations.
8Table 3: Savings rate instrument
Diﬀ-1 Diﬀ-2 Diﬀ-2 Sys-2 Sys-2
GMM (AJRY) GMM GMM END GMM END GMM END CL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable is Democracyt
Democracyt 1 0.427*** 0.376*** 0.367*** 0.584*** 0.575***
(0.100) (0.116) (0.093) (0.054) (0.072)
Log GDP per capitat 1 -0.228** -0.104 -0.148** 0.110*** 0.114***
(0.102) (0.078) (0.068) (0.018) (0.023)
Instruments 53 53 89 107 16
Hansen J-test [0.343] [0.343] [0.263] [0.213] [0.058]
Diﬀ-in-Hansen test [0.630] [0.037]
AR(1) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) [0.719] [0.825] [0.844] [0.441] [0.436]
Observations 764 764 764 891 891
Countries 124 124 124 134 134
Notes: Base sample – taken from Acemoglu et al. (2008) – is an unbalanced panel spanning from 1960–2000 with data at ﬁve-year
intervals, where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable. The dependent variable is the Augmented Freedom
House Political Rights Index. Standard errors are in parentheses, p-values in brackets. All GMM regressions use robust standard
errors and treat the lagged democracy measure as predetermined as well as the second lag of the savings rate as additional external
instrument. In addition to that, regressions with suﬃx “END” treat lagged log GDP per capita as endogenous and regressions
with suﬃx “CL” follow Roodman (2009b) and collapse the instrument matrix and use only two lags. In the case of two-step
GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) ﬁnite sample correction for standard errors is employed. *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance at the
10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively. The row for the Hansen J-test reports the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument
validity. The values reported for the Diﬀ-in-Hansen test are the p-values for the validity of the additional moment restriction
necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for ﬁrst and second order autocorrelated
disturbances in the ﬁrst diﬀerences equations.
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